



For Richard Rorty, 
an inspiration in more ways than one
In some contexts, public debates about justice assume the guise 
of normal discourse. However fiercely they disagree about what 
exactly justice requires in a given case, the contestants share some 
underlying presuppositions about what an intelligible jus tice claim 
looks like. They share ontological assumptions about the kind(s) 
of actors who are entitled to make such claims (usually, individu-
als) and about the kind of agency from which they should seek 
redress (typically, a territorial state). In addition, the disputants 
share assumptions about scope, which fix the circle of interlocu-
tors to whom claims for justice should be addressed (usually, the 
citizenry of a bounded political community) and which delimit 
the universe of those whose interests and concerns deserve consid-
eration (ditto). Finally, the contestants share social-theoretical as-
sumptions about the space in which questions of justice can intel-
ligibly arise (often, the economic space of distribution) and about 
the social cleavages that can harbor injustices (typically, class and 
ethnicity). In such contexts, where those who argue about justice 
share a set of underlying assumptions, their contests assume a 
relatively regular, recognizable shape. Constituted through a set 
of organizing principles, and manifesting a discernible grammar, 
such conflicts take the form of “normal justice.”1
Of course, it is doubtful that justice discourse is ever fully normal 
in the sense just described. There may well be no real-world con-
text in which public debates about justice remain wholly within 
the bounds set by a given set of constitutive assumptions. And 
we may never encounter a case in which every participant shares 
every assumption. Whenever a situation approaching normality 
does appear, moreover, one may well suspect that it rests on the 
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suppression or marginalization of those who dissent from the 
reigning consensus.
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding these caveats, we may still 
speak of “normal justice” in a meaningful sense. By analogy 
with Thomas Kuhn’s understanding of normal science, justice 
discourse is normal just so long as public dissent from, and diso-
bedience to, its constitutive assumptions remains contained.2 So 
long as deviations remain private or appear as anomalies, so long 
as they do not cumulate and destructure the discourse, then the 
field of public-sphere conflicts over justice retains a recogniza-
ble, hence a “normal,” shape. 
By this standard, the present context is one of “abnormal justice.”3 
Even as public debates about justice proliferate, they increasingly 
lack the structured character of normal discourse. Today’s dispu-
tants often lack any shared understanding of what the authors of 
justice claims should look like, as some countenance states and 
communities, while others admit only individuals. In the same 
way, those who argue about justice today often share no view of 
the agency of redress, as some envision new transnational or cos-
mopolitan institutions, while others restrict their appeals to ter-
ritorial states. Often, too, the disputants hold divergent views of 
the proper circle of interlocutors, as some address their claims to 
international public opinion, while others would confine discus-
sion within bounded polities. Likewise, present-day contestants 
often disagree about who is entitled to consideration in matters 
of justice, as some accord standing to all human beings, while 
others restrict concern to their fellow citizens. In addition, those 
who argue about justice today often disagree about the conceptu-
al space within which claims for justice can arise, as some admit 
only (economic) claims for redistribution, while others would 
also admit (cultural) claims for recognition and (political) claims 
for representation. Finally, today’s disputants often disagree as 
to which social cleavages can harbor injustices, as some admit 
only nationality and class, while others also accept gender and 
sexuality.
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The result is that current debates about justice have a freewheel-
ing character. Absent the ordering force of shared presupposi-
tions, they lack the structured shape of normal discourse. This 
is patently true for informal contests over justice in civil soci-
ety, where it has always been possible in principle to problema-
t ize doxa – witness the affair of the Danish cartoons, which is 
better grasped as a species of abnormal discourse about justice 
than as a clash of civilizations, on the one hand, or as an ex-
emplar of liberal public reason, on the other. But abnormality 
also swirls around institutionalized arenas of argument, such as 
courts and arbitration bodies, whose principal raison d’être is to 
normal ize justice–witness the dispute among the Justices of the 
US Supreme Court in a recent death penalty case over whether 
it is prop er to cite opinions of foreign courts. In these cases of 
raucous clashes over basic premises deviation is less the excep-
tion than the rule. Far from appearing in the guise of anomalies 
with in a relatively stable field of argument, abnormality invades 
the central precincts of justice discourse. No sooner do first-or-
der disputes arise than they become overlaid with meta-disputes 
over constitutive assumptions, concerning who counts and what 
is at stake. Not only substantive questions, but also the grammar 
of justice itself, are up for grabs.
This situation is by no means unprecedented. Even the most 
cursory reflection suggests some historical parallels. One prior 
era of abnormal justice in Europe is the period leading up to 
the Treaty of Westphalia, when the feudal political imaginary 
was unraveling, but the system of territorial states had not yet 
been consolidated.4
 Another is the period following World War 
I, when nascent internationalisms collided with resurgent natio-
nalisms amidst the ruins of three major empires.5 In those cases, 
absent a secure and settled hegemony, competing paradigms 
clashed, and efforts to normalize justice did not succeed. Such 
cases are scarcely exceptional. It is likely, in fact, that normal ju-
stice is historically abnormal, while abnormal justice represents 
the historical norm.
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Nevertheless, today’s abnormalities are historically specific, re-
flective of recent developments, including the break-up of the 
Cold War order, contested US hegemony, the rise of neolibera-
lism, and the new salience of globalization. Under these condi-
tions, established paradigms tend to unsettle, and claims for ju-
stice easily become unmoored from pre-existing islands of nor-
malcy. This is the case for each of three major families of justice 
claims: claims for socio-economic redistribution, claims for legal 
or cultural recognition, and claims for political representation. 
Thus, in the wake of transnationalized production, globalized 
finance, and neoliberal trade and investment regimes, redistri-
bution claims increasingly trespass the bounds of state-centered 
grammars and arenas of argument. Likewise, given transnational 
migration and global media flows, the claims for recognition of 
once distant “others” acquire a new proximity, destabilizing ta-
ken-for-granted horizons of cultural value. Finally, in an era of 
contested superpower hegemony, global governance, and trans-
national politics, claims for representation increasingly break the 
previous frame of the modern territorial state. In this situation 
of de-normalization, justice claims immediately run up against 
counterclaims, whose underlying assumptions they do not share. 
Whether the issue is redistribution, recognition, or representati-
on, current disputes evince a heteroglossia of justice discourse, 
which lacks any semblance of normality.
In this situation, our familiar theories of justice offer little 
guidance. Formulated for contexts of normal justice, they focus 
largely on first-order questions. What constitutes a just distribu-
tion of wealth and resources? What counts as reciprocal recogni-
tion or equal respect? What constitutes fair terms of political re-
presentation and equal voice? Premised upon a shared grammar, 
these theories do not tell us how to proceed when we encounter 
conflicting assumptions concerning moral standing, social clea-
vage, and agency of redress. Thus, they fail to provide the con-
ceptual resources for dealing with problems of abnormal justice, 
so characteristic of the present era.
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What sort of theory of justice could provide guidance in this si-
tuation? What type of theorizing can handle cases in which first-
order disputes about justice are overlaid with meta-disputes about 
what counts as an intelligible first-order claim? In this essay, I 
shall suggest a way of approaching questions of (in)justice in ab-
normal times. What I have to say divides into two parts. First, I 
shall identify three nodes of abnormality in contemporary dis-
putes about justice. Then, I shall formulate three corresponding 
conceptual strategies for clarifying these abnormalities.
1.  Nodes of Abnormality in a Globalizing World
I begin by sketching a recent dispute over social justice:
Claiming to promote justice for workers at home and abroad, la-
bor unions in developed countries seek to block imports whose 
production conditions do not meet domestic environmental, 
health, and safety standards. Organizations representing workers 
in the developing world object that, in imposing standards they 
cannot possibly meet at the present time, this seemingly progres-
sive approach is actually a species of unjust protectionism. De-
bated in both domestic and transnational public spheres, the first 
position finds support among those who advocate the pursuit of 
justice through democratic politics at the level of the territori-
al state, while the second is championed both by proponents of 
global justice and by free-marketeers. Meanwhile, corporations 
and states dispute related issues in international legal arenas. For 
example, a NAFTA arbitration panel hears arguments from a 
US-based multinational, which contends that Canada’s relatively 
stringent environmental and labor laws constitute an illegal res-
traint on trade. The US representative on the three-judge panel 
finds for the corporation, on free-trade grounds. The Canadian 
representative finds against, invoking the self-government rights 
of the Canadian citizenry. The Mexican representative casts the 
deciding vote; finding for the corporation, and thus siding with 
the United States, he invokes poor nations’ right to development. 
At the same time, however, the legitimacy of these proceedings 
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is disputed. In transnational civil society, demonstrators protest 
against NAFTA, the WTO, and other governance structures of the 
global economy. Pronouncing these structures unjust and unde-
mocratic, activists meeting at the World Social Forum debate the 
contours of an alternative “globalization from below.”
This is an example of “abnormal justice.” Traversing multiple dis-
cursive arenas, some formal, some informal, some mainstream, 
some subaltern, the locus of argument shifts with dizzying speed. 
And far from going without saying, the topography of debate is 
itself an object of dispute. Offshore contestants strive to pierce 
the bounds of domestic debates, even as nationalists and country-
level democrats seek to territorialize them. Meanwhile, states and 
corporations work to contain disputes within regional juridical in-
stitutions, even as transnational social movements strain to widen 
them. Thus, the very shape of controversy, uncontested in normal 
discourse, is here a focus of explicit struggle. Even as they dis-
pute substantive issues, then, the contestants also rehearse deep 
disagreements about who is entitled to address claims to whom 
concerning what; about where and how such claims should be 
vetted; and about who is obliged to redress them, if and when 
they are vindicated.
The abnormalities are not wholly random, however, as they con-
stellate around three principal nodes. The first node reflects the 
absence of a shared view of the “what” of justice. At issue here 
is the matter of justice, the substance with which it is concerned. 
Given that justice is a comparative relation, what is it that justice 
compares? What social-ontological presuppositions distinguish 
well-formed from ill-formed claims? Such matters go without say-
ing in normal justice–as, for example, when all parties conceive 
justice in distributive terms, as concerned with the allocation of 
divisible goods, which are typically economic in nature. In ab-
normal contexts, by contrast, the “what” of justice is in dispute. 
Here we encounter claims that do not share a common ontology. 
Where one party perceives distributive injustice, another sees sta-
tus hierarchy, and still another political domination.6
 Thus, even 
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those who agree that the status quo is unjust disagree as to how 
to describe it.
Divergent assumptions concerning the “what” suffuse the example 
just sketched. There, offshore workers’ economic claims, aimed 
at dismantling protectionist barriers, which maintain distributi-
ve injustice, collide with a territorial citizenry’s political claims, 
aimed at repulsing neoliberal encroachments, which imperil the 
democratic sovereignty of a bounded polity. The effect is a bewil-
dering lack of consensus, even among professed democrats and 
egalitarians, as to how to understand the injustice, let alone how 
to redress it. The very “what” of justice is up for grabs.
A second node of abnormality reflects the lack of a shared un-
derstanding of the “who” of justice. At issue here is the scope 
of justice, the frame within which it applies: who counts as a 
subject of justice in a given matter? Whose interests and needs 
deserve consideration? Who belongs to the circle of those en-
titled to equal concern? Such matters go without saying in normal 
justice–as, for example, when all parties frame their disputes as 
matters internal to territorial states, thereby equating the “who” 
of justice with the citizenry of a bounded polity. In abnormal jus-
tice, by contrast, the “who” is up for grabs. Here we encounter 
conflicting framings of justice disputes. Where one party frames 
the question in terms of a domestic, territorial “who,” others posit 
“who’s” that are regional, transnational or global.7
Divergent assumptions about these matters, too, pervade the exam-
ple just sketched, which encompasses conflicting frames. There, 
some of the disputants evaluate Canadian labor regula tions in 
terms of their domestic effects, while others consider the effects 
on the larger North American region, and still others look further 
afield, to the interests of workers in the developing world or of 
global humanity. The result is a lack of consensus as to “who” 
counts. Not just the “what” of justice but also the “who” is in 
dispute.
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The third node of abnormality reflects the lack of a shared under-
standing of the “how” of justice. Here the issue is in essence pro-
cedural: how, in a given case, should one determine the pertinent 
grammar for reflecting on justice? By which criteria or decision 
procedure should one resolve disputes about the “what” and the 
“who”? In normal justice, such questions do not arise by defini-
tion, as the “what” and the “who” are not in dispute. In abnormal 
contexts, by contrast, with both those parameters up for grabs, 
disagreements about the “how” are bound to erupt. Here we en-
counter conflicting scenarios for resolving disputes. Where one 
party invokes the authority of an interstate treaty, others appeal 
to the United Nations, the balance of power, and the institutional-
ized procedures of a cosmopolitan democracy that remains to be 
invented.8
Uncertainty about the “how” suffuses the argument sketched 
here. In that case, states and corporations look to NAFTA for re-
solution, while anti-neoliberalism activists look instead to trans-
national popular struggle aimed at influencing global public opi-
nion. Whereas the first appeal to a treaty-based regional arena of 
dispute resolution, the second appeal to a “World Social Forum” 
that lacks institutionalized authority to make and enforce binding 
decisions. Here, then, there is no agreement as to how disputes 
about the grammar of justice should be resolved. Not just the 
“what” and the “who,” but also the ”how” of justice is up for 
grabs.
Together, these three nodes of abnormality reflect the destabili-
zation of the previous hegemonic grammar. Today’s uncertainty 
about the “what” reflects the decentering of that grammar’s sub-
stantive understanding of the matter of justice. What has been 
problematized here is the view that identifies justice exclusively 
with fair economic distribution. That understanding organized 
the lion’s share of argument in the decades following World War 
Two. Subtending the otherwise disparate political cultures of 
First World social democracy, Second World communism, and 
Third World “developmentalism,” the distributive interpretation 
of the “what” tended to marginalize non-economic wrongs. Cast-
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ing maldistribution as the quintessential injustice, it obscured in-
justices of misrecognition, rooted in hierarchies of status, as well 
as injustices of misrepresentation, rooted in the political consti-
tution of society.9
Analogously, today’s uncertainty about the “who” reflects the de-
stabilization of the previous grammar’s frame. In this case, what 
has been problematized is the Westphalian view that the modern 
territorial state is the sole unit within which justice applies. That 
view framed most justice discourse in the post-war era. In con-
junction with the distributive conception, it organized otherwise 
disparate political cultures throughout the world, notwithstand-
ing lip service to human rights, proletarian internationalism, and 
Third-World solidarity. Effectively territorializing justice, the 
Westphalian frame equated the scope of concern with the citizen-
ry of a bounded political community. The effect was to drastical-
ly limit, if not wholly to exclude, binding obligations of justice 
that cut across borders. Constructing a set of territorially bounded 
domestic “who’s,” discrete and arrayed side-by-side, this frame 
obscured transborder injustices.10
Finally, today’s uncertainty concerning the “how” reflects the 
new salience of a previously unspoken feature of the postwar 
grammar. What has become visible, and therefore contestable, 
is a hidden hegemonic assumption. So long as the lion’s share of 
justice discourse was governed by Westphalian-distributivist as-
sumptions, there was little overtly perceived need for institutions 
and procedures for resolving disputes about the “what” and the 
“who.” On those occasions when such a need was perceived, it 
was assumed that powerful states and private elites would re solve 
those disputes, in intergovernmental organizations or smoke-
filled back rooms. The effect was to discourage open democratic 
contestation of the “what” and the “who.”
Today, however, none of these three normalizing assumptions 
goes without saying. The hegemony of the distributive “what” 
has been challenged from at least two sides: first, by diverse prac-
titioners of the politics of recognition, ranging from multicultura-
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lists who seek to accommodate differences to ethno-nationalists 
who seek to eliminate them; and second, by diverse practitioners 
of the politics of representation, ranging from feminists campaig-
ning for gender quotas on electoral lists to national minorities de-
manding power-sharing arrangements. As a result, there are now 
in play at least three rival conceptions of the “what” of justice: 
redistribution, recognition, and representation.
Meanwhile, the hegemony of the Westphalian “who” has been 
challenged from at least three directions: first, by localists and 
communalists, who seek to locate the scope of concern in sub-
national units; second, by regionalists and transnationalists, who 
propose to identify the “who” of justice with larger, though not 
fully universal, units, such as “Europe” or “Islam”; and third, by 
globalists and cosmopolitans, who propose to accord equal con-
sideration to all human beings. Consequently, there are now in 
play at least four rival views of the “who” of justice: Westphalian, 
local-communalist, transnational-regional, and global-cosmopo-
litan.
Finally, the silent sway of the hegemonic “how” has been chal-
lenged by a general rise in democratic expectations, as mobilized 
movements of all these kinds demand a say about the “what” and 
the “who.” Contesting hegemonic institutions and frames, such 
movements have effectively challenged the prerogative of states 
and elites to determine the grammar of justice. Inciting broad 
debates about the “what” and the “who,” they have put in play, 
alongside the hegemonic presumption, populist and democratic 
views of the “how” of justice.
The appearance of rival views of the “what,” the “who,” and the 
“how” poses a major problem for anyone who cares about inju-
stice today. Somehow, we must work through these meta-disputes 
without losing sight of pressing problems of first-order justice. 
But with all three parameters in play simultaneously, we have 
no firm ground on which to stand. Abnormality confronts us at 
every turn.
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2.  Strategies for Theorizing Justice in Abnormal Times
What sort of theory of justice could provide guidance in this situ-
ation? To find a convincing answer, one must start with a balan-
ced view of the matter at hand. The key, I think, is to appreciate 
both the positive and negative sides of abnormal justice. The po-
sitive side is an expansion of the field of contestation, hence the 
chance to challenge injustices that the previous grammar elided. 
For example, the decentering of the distributive “what” renders 
visible, and criticizable, non-economic harms of misrecogniti-
on and misrepresentation. Likewise, the de-normalization of the 
Westphalian “who” makes conceivable a hitherto obscure type of 
meta-injustice, which I shall call “misframing,” in which first-or-
der questions of justice are unjustly framed– as when the national 
framing of distributive issues forecloses the claims of the global 
poor.11 If we assume, as I think we should, that misrecognition, 
misrepresentation, and misframing belong in principle in the cata-
logue of genuine injustices, then the destabilization of a grammar 
that obscured them must rank as a positive development. Here, 
then, is the good side of abnormal justice: expanded possibilities 
for contesting injustice.
But abnormal justice also has a negative side. The problem is 
that expanded contestation cannot by itself overcome injustice. 
Overcoming injustice requires at least two additional conditions: 
first, a relatively stable framework in which claims can be equi-
tably vetted; and second, institutionalized agencies and means 
of redress. Both these conditions are absent in abnormal justice. 
How can demands be fairly evaluated and injustices be legitimate-
ly rectified in contexts in which the “what,” the “who,” and the 
“how” are intensely disputed? Here then is the negative side of 
abnormal justice: amidst expanded contestation, reduced means 
for corroborating and redressing injustice.
Those who would theorize justice in abnormal times must keep 
both sides of this equation in view. What sort of theorizing could 
simultaneously valorize expanded contestation and strengthen 
diminished capacities of adjudication and redress? Without pre-
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tending to present a full answer, I propose to hunt for clues by 
re-examining the three nodes of abnormality just described. Con-
sidered in turn, each can tell us something important about how 
to think about justice in abnormal times.
A.  The “What” of Justice: 
 Participatory Parity in Three Dimensions
Consider, first, the problem of the “what.” Here, the question is: 
what sort of approach can validate contestation of reductive dis-
tributivism while also clarifying prospects for resolving disputes 
that encompass rival understandings of the matter of justice? The 
short answer is: an approach that combines a multidimensional 
social ontology with normative monism. Let me explain.
In order to validate expanded contestation, a theory of justice 
must hold out the prospect of a fair hearing for disputants’ claims. 
If it is to avoid foreclosing demands in advance, the theory must 
be able to entertain claims that presuppose nonstandard views of 
the “what” of justice. Erring on the side of inclusiveness, then, it 
should begin by assuming that injustice comes in more than one 
form and that no single view of the “what” can capture them all. 
Rejecting social-ontological monism, it should conceive justice 
as encompassing multiple dimensions, each of which is associ-
ated with an analytically distinct genre of injustice and revealed 
through a conceptually distinct type of social struggle.
Consider three possibilities I have already alluded to. As seen, 
first, from the standpoint of labor struggles, justice comprises an 
economic dimension, rooted in political economy, whose asso-
ciated injustice is maldistribution or class inequality. As seen, 
second, in contrast, from the perspective of struggles over multi-
culturalism, justice encompasses a cultural dimension, rooted in 
the status order, whose corresponding injustice is misrecognition 
or status hierarchy. As seen, finally, through the lens of democra-
tization struggles, justice includes a political dimension, rooted in 
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the political constitution of society, whose associated injustice is 
misrepresentation or political voicelessness.
Here, then, are three different views of the “what” of justice. In-
sofar as each of them corresponds to a bonafide form of injustice 
that cannot be reduced to the others, none can be legitimately 
excluded from contemporary theorizing. Thus, ontological mo-
nism with respect to injustice is deeply misguided.12 Contra those 
who insist on a single monistic account of the “what,” justice is 
better viewed as a multidimensional concept that encompasses 
the three dimensions of redistribution, recognition and represen-
tation.13 Such a conception is especially useful in abnormal times. 
Only by assuming at the outset that claims in all three dimensions 
are in principle intelligible can one provide a fair hearing to all 
claimants in disputes that harbor multiple views of the “what.”
But why only three? The examples just given suggest that, rather 
than being given all at once, the dimensions of justice are dis-
closed historically, through the medium of social struggle. On this 
view, social movements disclose new dimensions of justice when 
they succeed in establishing as plausible claims that transgress 
the established grammar of normal justice, which will appear re-
trospectively to have obscured the disadvantage their members 
suffer. But in the moment before a novel understanding of the 
“what” becomes broadly intelligible, the irruption of transgres-
sive claims sparks abnormal discourse.14 At such times, it remains 
unclear whether a new dimension of justice is being disclosed. 
It follows that any attempt to theorize justice in these conditions 
must allow for that possibility. Whoever dogmatically forecloses 
the prospect declares his or her thinking inadequate to the times.
What follows for a theory of justice for abnormal times? At the 
outset, one should practice hermeneutical charity with respect to 
claimants’ nonstandard views of the “what,” according them the 
presumption of intelligibility and potential validity. At the same 
time, the theory should test such views by considering whether 
they do in fact render visible genuine forms of injustice that the 
previous grammar foreclosed: and if so, whether these newly 
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disclosed forms are rooted in hitherto overlooked dimensions of 
social ordering. In today’s context, this means accepting as well-
formed and intelligible in principle at least three distinct views 
of the “what” of justice: namely, redistribution, recognition and 
representation.15 Provisionally embracing a three-dimensional 
view of justice, centered on economy, culture, politics, the theory 
should nevertheless remain open to the disclosure of further di-
mensions through social struggle. 
By itself, however, a multidimensional social ontology is not a 
solution. As soon we admit multiple genres of injustice, we need 
a way to bring them under a common measure. Thus, we need a 
normative principle that overarches them all. Absent such a com-
mensurating principle, we have no way to evaluate claims across 
different dimensions, hence no way to process disputes that en-
compass multiple views of the “what.” 
What might such a principle look like? My proposal is to sub-
mit claims in all three dimensions to the overarching normative 
principle of parity of participation. According to this principle, 
justice requires social arrangements that permit all to participate 
as peers in social life.16 On the view of justice as participatory 
parity, overcoming injustice means dismantling institutionalized 
obstacles that prevent some people from participating on a par 
with others, as full partners in social interaction. As the foregoing 
discussion suggests, such obstacles can be of at least three types. 
First, people can be impeded from full participation by economic 
structures that deny them the resources they need in order to in-
teract with others as peers; in that case they suffer from distribu-
tive injustice or maldistribution. Second, people can be prevented 
from interacting on terms of parity by institutionalized hierar-
chies of cultural value that deny them the requisite standing; in 
that case they suffer from status inequality or misrecognition.17 
Third, people can be impeded from full participation by decision 
rules that deny them equal voice in public deliberations and de-
mocratic decision-making; in that case they suffer from political 
injustice or misrepresentation.18
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Here, then, is an account in which three different types of inju-
stice lead to a common result: in each case, some social actors 
are prevented from participating on a par with others in social 
interaction. Thus, all three injustices violate a single principle, 
the principle of participatory parity. That principle overarches the 
three dimensions and serves to make them commensurable.19
The exact details of this account are less important than its overall 
conceptual structure. What is paramount here is that this view of 
the “what” of justice combines a multidimensional social onto-
logy with normative monism. As a result, it accommodates both 
the positive and negatives sides of abnormal justice. Thanks to 
its ontological multidimensionality, it validates contestation of 
normalizing distributivism. Stipulating that misrecognition and 
misrepresentation are genuine injustices in principle, it provides 
a fair hearing for claims that transgress the previous grammar. 
At the same time, thanks to its normative monism, this approach 
brings the three genres of injustice under a common measure. 
Submitting claims for redistribution, recognition, and represen-
tation to the overarching principle of participatory parity, it cre-
ates a single discursive space that can accommodate them all. 
Thus, this approach offers the prospect of evaluating claims un-
der conditions of abnormal discourse, where multiple views of 
the “what” of justice are in play.
And yet: a major question remains. Parity of participation among 
whom? Who exactly is entitled to participate on a par with whom 
in which social interactions? Unless we can find a suitable way of 
addressing the “who” of justice, this approach to the “what” will 
not be of any use.
B.  The “Who” of Justice: 
 Misframing and Political Subjection
I turn, accordingly, to the second node of abnormal justice, con-
cerning the “who.” For this issue, too, the pressing need is to 
accommodate both the positive and negative sides of abnormal 
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justice. What sort of theorizing can valorize contestation of the 
Westphalian frame, while also clarifying disputes that encompass 
conflicting views about who counts? The short answer is: theo-
rizing that is simultaneously reflexive and substantive. Let me 
explain.
In order to valorize expanded contestation, reflection on abnor-
mal justice must be open to claims that first-order questions of 
justice have been wrongly framed. To ensure that such claims 
receive a fair hearing, one should assume at the outset that in-
justices of misframing could exist in principle. Thus, abnormal 
justice theorizing must be reflexive. In order to apply the princi-
ple of participatory parity to first-order questions of distribution, 
recognition, and representation, one must be able to jump to the 
next level, where the frame itself is in dispute. Only by becoming 
reflexive can one grasp the question of the “who” as a question 
of justice.
How can one generate the reflexivity needed in abnormal justice? 
The strategy I propose draws on a distinctive conception of the 
political dimension. So far, I have considered this dimension in 
the usual way, as concerned exclusively with injustices of “or-
dinary-political misrepresentation.” These are political injustices 
that arise within a political community whose boundaries and 
membership are widely assumed to be settled. Thus, ordinary-
political misrepresentation occurs when a polity’s decision rules 
deny some who are counted in principle as members the chance 
to participate fully, as peers. Recently, such injustices have given 
rise to demands for changes in the mode of ordinary-political re-
presentation – ranging from demands for gender quotas on elec-
toral lists, multicultural rights, indigenous self-government, and 
provincial autonomy, on the one hand, to demands for campaign 
finance reform, redistricting, proportional representation, and cu-
mulative voting, on the other.20
Important as such matters are, they represent only half the story. 
In addition to ordinary-political injustice, which arises within the 
frame of a bounded polity, we can also conceptualize a second le-
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vel, of “meta-political injustice,” which arises as a result of the di-
vision of political space into bounded polities. This second level 
of “meta-political misrepresentation” comprehends injustices of 
misframing. Such injustices occur when a polity’s boundaries are 
drawn in such a way as to wrongly deny some people the chance 
to participate at all in its authorized contests over justice. In such 
cases, those who are constituted as nonmembers are wrongly ex-
cluded from the universe of those entitled to consideration within 
the polity in matters of distribution, recognition, and ordinary-
political representation. The injustice remains, moreover, even 
when those excluded from one polity are included as subjects of 
justice in another – as long as the effect of the political division 
is to put some relevant aspects of justice beyond their reach. An 
example is the way in which the international system of suppos-
edly equal sovereign states gerrymanders political space at the 
expense of the global poor.
Although they do not use the term, the notion of misframing is 
implicit in the claims of some participants in the World Social 
Forum. In their eyes, the Westphalian frame is unjust, as it parti-
tions political space in ways that block many who are poor and 
despised from challenging the forces that oppress them. Channel-
ing their claims into the domestic political spaces of relatively 
powerless, if not wholly failed, states, this frame insulates off-
shore powers from critique and control.21
 Among those shielded 
from the reach of justice are more powerful predator states and 
transnational private powers, including foreign investors and cre-
ditors, international currency speculators, and transnational cor-
porations.22 Also protected are the governance structures of the 
global economy, which set exploitative terms of interaction and 
then exempt them from democratic control.23 Finally, the West-
phalian frame is self-insulating, as the architecture of the inter-
state system excludes transnational democratic decision-making 
on issues of justice.24
Such, at any rate, are the claims of some participants in the World 
Social Forum. Their concerns pertain to our second level of jus-
tice, the meta-political level, which encompasses wrongs of mis-
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framing. Oriented to the possibility that first-order framings of 
justice may themselves be unjust, this level grasps the question 
of the frame as a question of justice. As a result, it provides the 
reflexivity needed to parse disputes about the “who” in abnormal 
justice.
By itself, however, reflexivity is not a solution. As soon as we 
accept that injustices of misframing can exist in principle, we 
require some means of deciding when and where they exist in rea-
lity. Thus, a theory of justice for abnormal times requires a sub-
stantive normative principle for evaluating frames. Absent such a 
substantive principle, we have no way to assess the alternatives, 
hence no way to clarify disputes that encompass conflicting un-
derstandings of the “who.” 
What might a substantive principle for evaluating frames look 
like? Currently, there are three major candidates on offer. Pro-
ponents of the membership principle propose to resolve disputes 
concerning the “who” by appealing to criteria of political belong-
ing. For them, accordingly, what turns a collection of individu-
als into fellow subjects of justice is shared citizenship or shared 
nationality.25 Because this approach delimits frames on the basis 
of political membership, it has the advantage of being grounded 
in existing institutional reality and/or in widely held collective 
identifications. Yet that strength is also its weakness. In practice, 
the membership principle serves all too easily to ratify the exclu-
sionary nationalisms of the privileged and powerful – hence, to 
shield established frames from critical scrutiny. 
No wonder, then, that some philosophers and activists look instead 
to the principle of humanism. Seeking a more inclusive standard, 
they propose to resolve disputes concerning the “who” by appeal-
ing to criteria of personhood. For them, accordingly, what turns a 
collection of individuals into fellow subjects of justice is common 
possession of distinguishing features of humanity, such as auto-
nomy, rationality, language, or capacity for suffering.26 Because 
this approach delimits frames on the basis of personhood, it pro-
vides a critical check on exclusionary nationalism. Yet its lofty 
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abstraction is also its weakness. Cavalierly oblivious to actual or 
historical social relations, it accords standing indiscriminately to 
everyone in respect to everything. Adopting the one-size-fits-all 
frame of global humanity, it forecloses the possibility that diffe-
rent issues require different frames or scales of justice.
Understandably, then, yet another group of philosophers and ac-
tivists rejects both the exclusionary nationalism of membership 
and the abstract globalism of humanism. Aiming to conceptua-
lize transnational justice, proponents of the all-affected princi-
ple propose to resolve disputes about the “who” by appealing to 
social relations of interdependence. For them, accordingly, what 
makes a group of people fellow subjects of justice is their objec-
tive co-imbrication in a web of causal relationships.27 This ap-
proach has the merit of providing a critical check on self-serving 
notions of membership, while also taking cognizance of social 
relations. Yet by conceiving relations objectivistically, in terms 
of causality, it effectively relegates the choice of the “who” to 
normal social science. In addition, the all-affected principle falls 
prey to the reductio ad absurdum of the butterfly effect, which 
holds that everyone is affected by everything. Unable to identify 
morally relevant social relations, it has trouble resisting the one-
size-fits-all globalism it sought to avoid. Thus, it too fails to sup-
ply a defensible standard for determining the “who.” 
Given the respective deficiencies of membership, humanism, 
and affectedness, what sort of substantive principle can help us 
evaluate rival frames in abnormal justice? I propose to submit 
allegations of misframing to what I shall call the all-subjected 
principle. According to this principle, all those who are subject 
to a given governance structure have moral standing as subjects 
of justice in relation to it. On this view, what turns a collection of 
people into fellow subjects of justice is neither shared citizenship 
or nationality, nor common possession of abstract personhood, 
nor the sheer fact of causal interdependence, but rather their joint 
subjection to a structure of governance, which sets the ground 
rules that govern their interaction.28
 For any such governance 
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structure, the all-subjected principle matches the scope of moral 
concern to that of subjection.29
Of course, everything depends on how we interpret the phrase 
“subjection to structure of governance.” I understand this ex-
pression broadly, as encompassing relations to powers of various 
types. Not restricted to states, governance structures also comprise 
non-state agencies that generate enforceable rules that structure 
important swaths of social interaction. The most obvious examp-
les are the agencies that set the ground rules of the global econo-
my, such as the World Trade Organization and the International 
Monetary Fund. But many other examples could also be cited, 
including transnational structures governing environmental regu-
lation (the Kyoto protocols), atomic and nuclear power (the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency), policing (Interpol), health (the 
World Health Organization), and the administration of civil and 
criminal law (the World Intellectual Property Organization, the 
International Criminal Court, and Interpol). Insofar as such agen-
cies regulate the interaction of large transnational populations, 
they can be said to subject the latter, even though the rule-makers 
are not accountable to those whom they govern. Given this broad 
understanding of governance structures, the term “subjection” 
should be understood broadly as well. Not restricted to formal 
citizenship, or even to the broader condition of falling within the 
jurisdiction of such a state, this notion also encompasses the fur-
ther condition of being subject to the coercive power of non-state 
forms of governmentality.
Understood in this way, the all-subjected principle affords a cri-
tical standard for assessing the justice of frames. An issue is just-
ly framed if and only if everyone subjected to the governance 
structure(s) that regulate the relevant swath(s) of social interac-
tion is accorded equal consideration. To deserve such considera-
tion, moreover, one need not already be an accredited member of 
the structure in question; one need only be subjected to it. Thus, 
sub-Saharan Africans who have been involuntarily disconnected 
from the global economy as a result of the rules imposed by its 
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governance structures count as subjects of justice in relation to it, 
even if they are not counted officially as participating in it.30
The all-subjected principle remedies the major defects of the pre-
vious principles. Unlike membership, it pierces the self-serving 
shield of exclusionary nationalism to contemplate injustices of 
misframing. Unlike humanism, it overcomes abstract, all-embrac-
ing globalism by taking notice of social relationships. Unlike af-
fectedness, it avoids the indiscriminateness of the butterfly effect 
by identifying the morally relevant type of social relation, name-
ly, subjection to a governance structure. Far from substituting a 
single global “who” for the Westphalian “who,” the all-subjected 
principle militates against any one-size-fits-all framing of justice. 
In today’s world, all of us are subject to a plurality of different 
governance structures, some local, some national, some regional, 
and some global. The need, accordingly, is to delimit a variety of 
different frames for different issues. Able to mark out a plurality 
of “who’s” for different purposes, the all-subjected principle tells 
us when and where to apply which frame – and thus, who is en-
titled to parity of participation with whom in a given case.
In this case of this proposal, too, the details are less important 
than the overall conceptual structure. What is crucial here is 
that this approach combines the reflexive questioning of justice 
frames with a substantive evaluative principle. In this way, it 
accommodates both the positive and negative sides of abnor-
mal justice. Thanks to its reflexivity, the concept of misframing 
validates contestation of the Westphalian frame. Because it is 
pitched to the meta-level, this concept permits us to entertain the 
possibility that first-order questions of justice have been unjustly 
framed. At the same time, thanks to its substantive character, this 
approach offers a way of assessing the justice of various “who’s.” 
By submitting proposed frames to the all-subjected principle, it 
enables us to weigh their relative merits. Thus, this approach holds 
considerable promise for clarifying disputes about the “who” in 
abnormal times.
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And yet: another major question remains. How exactly ought we 
to implement the all-subjected principle? By way of what proce-
dures and processes can that principle be applied to resolve dis-
putes about who counts in abnormal times? Unless we can find a 
suitable way of addressing the “how” of justice, this approach to 
the “who” will not be of any use.
C.  The “How” of Justice: Institutionalizing Meta-Democracy
This brings me, finally, to the problem of the “how.” For this is-
sue, too, the trick is to accommodate both the positive and nega-
tive sides of abnormal justice. What sort of justice theorizing can 
valorize expanded contestation, while also clarifying disputes in 
which there is no shared understanding of the “how” of justice? 
The short answer is: theorizing that is at once dialogical and in-
stitutional. Let me explain.
In order to valorize expanded contestation, a theory of justice for 
abnormal times must abjure two approaches that have already 
surfaced in the previous considerations. First, it must suspend the 
hegemonic presumption that powerful states and private elites 
should determine the grammar of justice. As we saw, this view 
went without saying in normal justice, when disputes about the 
“who” were sufficiently rare and restricted to be settled in smoke-
filled back rooms. Today, however, as social movements contest 
the Westphalian frame, they are challenging such prerogatives – 
by the mere fact of treating the question of the frame as a proper 
subject of public debate. Asserting their right to a say in deter-
mining the “who,” they are simultaneously problematizing the 
hegemonic “how.” Above and beyond their other demands, then, 
these movements are effectively demanding something more: the 
creation of new, non-hegemonic procedures for handling disputes 
about the framing of justice in abnormal times. This demand, 
too, deserves a fair hearing. In order to avoid foreclosing it in ad-
vance, a theory of justice for times such as these must entertain 
non-standard views of the “how.”
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Second, a theory of justice for abnormal times must reject what 
I shall call “the scientistic presumption.” Supposed by some pro-
ponents of the all-affected principle, this understanding of the 
“how” of justice holds that decisions about the frame should be 
determined by normal social science, which is presumed to pos-
sess uncontroversial facts concerning who is affected by what, 
and thus who deserves consideration in respect of which issues. 
In abnormal justice, however, disputes about the frame are not 
reducible to simple questions of empirical fact, as the historical 
interpretations, social theories, and normative assumptions that 
necessarily underlie factual claims are themselves in dispute.31 
Under conditions of injustice, moreover, what passes for social 
“science” in the mainstream may well reflect the perspectives, and 
entrench the blindspots, of the privileged. In these conditions, to 
adopt the scientistic presumption is to risk foreclosing the claims 
of the disadvantaged. Thus, a theory committed to expanded con-
testation must reject this presumption. Without denying the re-
levance of social knowledge, it must refuse any suggestion that 
disputes about the “who” be settled by “justice technocrats.”32
What other possibilities remain? Despite the differences between 
them, the hegemonic presumption and the scientistic presump-
tion share a common premise. Both propose to settle framing 
disputes monologically, by appeal to an authority (in one case 
power, in the other case science) that is not accountable to the dis-
cursive give-and-take of political debate. A theory of justice for 
abnormal times must reject this monological premise. To validate 
contestation, it must treat framing disputes dialogically, as politi-
cal conflicts whose legitimate resolution requires unconstrained, 
inclusive public discussion. Rejecting appeals to authority, ab-
normal justice theorizing must envision a dialogical process for 
applying the all-subjected principle to disputes about the “who.”
Thus, a theory of justice for abnormal times must be dialogical. 
By itself, however, dialogue is not a solution. As soon as we ac-
cept that conflicts concerning the frame must be handled discur-
sively, we need to envision a way in which public discourse con-
cerning the “who” could eventuate in public resolutions. Absent 
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an account of the relation between contestation and legitimate 
decision-making, we have no way to implement the all-subjected 
principle, hence no way to process disputes in abnormal justice.
How should one conceive this relation? One approach, call it “po-
pulism,” would situate the nexus of contest and decision in civil 
society. Thus, this approach would assign the task of applying the 
all-subjected principle to social movements or discursive arenas 
like the World Social Forum.33 Although it appears to fulfill the di-
alogism requirement, populism is nevertheless unsatisfactory for 
at least two reasons. First, even the best civil society formations 
are neither sufficiently representative nor sufficiently democratic 
to legitimate their proposals to reframe justice. Second, these for-
mations lack the capacity to convert their proposals into binding 
political decisions. Put differently, although they can introduce 
novel claims into public debate, by themselves civil society ac-
tors can neither warrant claims nor make binding decisions.
These limitations suggest the need for a second track of the di-
alogical process, a formal institutional track. This second track 
should stand in a dynamic interactive relation to the first track. 
Conceived as one pole of a two-way communicative process, the 
formal institutional track must be responsive to the civil-society 
track.34 But it should differ from the latter in two respects. First, 
the institutional track requires fair procedures and a representative 
structure to ensure the democratic legitimacy of its deliberations. 
Second, the representatives, while accountable via publicity and 
elections, must have the capacity to take binding decisions about 
the “who” that reflect their communicatively generated judgment 
as to who is in fact subjected to a given structure of governance.
The upshot is that abnormal justice requires the invention of new 
global democratic institutions where disputes about the frame can 
be aired and resolved. Assuming that such disputes will not go 
away anytime soon, and may not be susceptible of any defini-
tive, final resolution, the approach I propose views them as an 
enduring feature of political life in a globalizing world. Thus, 
it advocates new institutions for staging and provisionally resol-
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ving such disputes democratically, in permanent dialogue with 
transnational civil society.
Certainly, much more needs to said about the design and wor-
kings of such arrangements. But in this case, too, the details are 
less important than the overall conceptual structure of the pro-
posal. What is paramount here is that this view of the “how” of 
justice combines dialogical and institutional features. As a re-
sult, it accommodates both the positive and negative sides of ab-
normal justice. Thanks to its dialogism, it validates contestation 
of previously taken-for-granted parameters of justice. Rejecting 
monologism, it seeks a fair hearing for claims that hegemonism 
and scientism foreclose. At the same time, thanks to its two-track 
character, it overcomes the legitimacy and decisional deficits of 
populism. Submitting meta-claims for the reframing of justice to 
a process of two-way communication between civil society and 
new global representative institutions, it envisions procedures for 
implementing the all-subjected principle in contexts of disagree-
ment about the “who.” Thus, this approach holds out the prospect 
of provisionally resolving conflicts over the frame in abnormal 
justice.
But that is not all. By providing a means to sort out meta-pro-
blems, this proposal clears a path to the pressing first-order pro-
blems with which we began. Coming to terms with injustices of 
misframing, it simultaneously opens the way to tackling injustices 
of maldistribution, misrecognition, and misrepresentation. Thus, 
this approach enables us to envision scenarios for overcoming or 
reducing injustice.
3.  Conclusion: Who’s Afraid of Abnormal Justice?
Let me conclude by summarizing my overall argument. I have 
argued that a theory of justice suited to conditions of abnormal 
discourse should combine three features. First, such a theory 
should encompass an account of the “what” of justice that is 
multidimensional in social ontology and normatively monist – for 
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example, an account that submits claims for redistribution, reco-
gnition, and ordinary-political representation to the principle of 
participatory parity. Second, such a theory should encompass a 
view of the “who” that is simultaneously reflexive and substan-
tive – for example, a view that submits claims against injustices 
of misframing to the all-subjected principle. Finally, a theory of 
justice for abnormal times should encompass a view of the “how” 
that is simultaneously dialogical and institutional– for example, a 
view that envisions new global representative institutions where 
meta-political claims can be submitted to deliberative-democratic 
decision-procedures.
More important than these specifics, however, is the general pro-
blem I have outlined here. Under conditions of abnormal justice, 
previously taken-for-granted assumptions about the “what,” the 
“who,” and the “how” no longer go without saying. Thus, these 
assumptions must themselves be subject to critical discussion and 
re-evaluation. In such discussions, the trick is to avoid two things. 
On the one hand, one must resist the reactionary and ultimately 
futile temptation to cling to assumptions that are no longer appro-
priate to our globalizing world, such as reductive distributivism 
and passé Westphalianism. On the other hand, one should avoid 
celebrating abnormality for its own sake, as if contestation were 
itself liberation. In this essay, I have tried to model an alternative 
stance, which acknowledges abnormal justice as the horizon with-
in which all struggles against injustice must currently proceed. 
Only by appreciating both the perils and prospects of this condi-
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